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ARGUMENT 
The O'Connells raise three arguments in their response and 
cross-appeal: (1) that they only agreed to the narrow arbitration 
language in the 1993 Application; (2) that the trial court 
correctly excluded the O'Connells' claims based upon the 
conversion statute (the "'statutory' claim") from arbitration, 
but incorrectly included the O'Connells' remaining claims; and 
(3) this Court should not award Blue Cross its attorney fees. 
I. THE O'CONNELLS AGREED TO THE BROAD ARBITRATION LANGUAGE OF 
THE SUBSCRIBER CERTIFICATE 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Consider the Broad 
Language of the Subscriber Certificate 
The trial court found in its initial ruling that the 
O'Connells agreed to certain language in the application for 
insurance coverage under the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's policy (the 
"Application"). Specifically, under the Application, the 
1 O'Connells agreed to "accept binding arbitration as a method of 
I resolving any disputes . . . concerning the applicability of, or 
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement." (R. 79). 
At that time, the trial court did "not reach the issue of 
whether the subscriber certificate also provided plaintiffs with 
additional notice of BCBSU's arbitration policy" (R. 187) because 
it found "the application constituted a valid agreement to 
arbitrate." (R. 187). The subscriber certificate, contained in 
the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's policy, the Rowland Hall-St. Mark's 
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Healthcare Agreement (the "Certificate")/ arguably contains 
broader language than the Application. Specifically, under the 
Certificate, the O'Connells agreed that "In the event of any 
dispute or controversy concerning the construction, 
interpretation, performance or breach of the Agreement . . . 
whether involving a claim in tort, contract or otherwise, the 
same shall be submitted to arbitration . . . ." (R. 85). 
Later, the trial court reversed, in part, its ruling that 
all of the O'Connells' claims were subject to arbitration under 
the Application, on the grounds that one of the O'Connells' 
claims was purportedly based upon statutory rights (the 
"'statutory' claim"), and because the trial court had "some 
reservations in leaving such issues of statutory interpretation 
to arbitration." (R. 206). This ruling was error because it 
did not even consider Blue Cross' argument that the Certificate 
encompassed all of the O'Connells' claims, including the so-
called 'statutory' claim. 
B. The O'Connells Agreed to the Terms of the Certificate 
The O'Connells now assert that they are not bound by the 
broader language of the subscriber certificate. (O'Connells' 
Brief, pp. 18-22). This argument fails for a number of reasons. 
First, the O'Connells' own complaint (the "Complaint") seeks 
to enforce rights under the very contract that contains the 
arbitration language the O'Connells now seek to avoid. For 
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example, the O'Connells allege in the First Cause of Action that 
"Defendant has breached its contract obligation under the terms 
of the subscriber certificate issued to members of the Rowland 
Hall group . . . ." Complaint, H 21 (R. 5) (emphasis added). A 
number of similar allegations are made throughout the Complaint. 
See, e.g., Complaint % 9 (alleging that "Defendant also agreed in 
the Subscriber Certificate, issued to Ann O'Connell as a member 
of the Rowland Hall group . . . .") (emphasis added); % 13 
(alleging that "Defendant agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate 
issued to members of the Rowland Hall group . . . .") (emphasis 
added). All of these allegations turn upon the "contract" that 
is the Certificate, containing the arbitration language the 
O'Connells now seek to avoid. Obviously, the O'Connells do not 
have the right to choose only those provisions of the contract 
they wish to enforce, while ignoring the others. 
This precise situation arose in Jeanes v. Arrow Insurance 
Company, 494 P.2d 1334 (Ariz. App. 1972), where a plaintiff 
brought a claim as a third party beneficiary to an uninsured 
motorist policy. Ld. at 1334. In that case, the plaintiff 
argued that because she had not signed the contract containing 
the arbitration provision, she was not bound by its terms. Id. 
at 1337. The court rejected that argument, holding that there --
as here -- "[t]he rights here involved were created by that 
contract [containing the arbitration agreement], and in order to 
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accept benefits under that contract she must accept and abide by 
the terms of the contract." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
as alleged in the Complaint, the Certificate applies to all of 
the O'Connells' claims.1 
Second, Ann O'Connell does not deny receiving the Policy in 
her Affidavit submitted to the trial court, instead noting that 
she "does not know when she received a Subscriber Certificate." 
(R. 129, 133) .2 However, under Utah law, if Blue Cross sent the 
policy to the O'Connells, and it was not rejected in 30 days, its 
terms are binding. Specifically, the Insurance Code mandates 
that renewal of an insurance policy on different terms is 
effective upon mailing: 
* ^ 
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the ^ **$^ 
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, c e j^ 
the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date J ^ M >0 
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to m\^^ 
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at '* jV > 
least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior 0^r +>*<>/ 
policy. (&'<*
 t^p 
_ n 
1
 The trial court implicitly found this was the case when 
it found "that by signing the application the plaintiff assented 
to BCBSU's arbitration policy." (R. 186). 
2
 What Ann O'Connell does admit, however, is finding a 
Blue Cross policy in her files that contains language 
substantively identical to the broad language of the Policy. (R. 
129, 133). Accordingly, the fact that the O'Connells future 
disputes with Blue Cross might or would be subject to arbitration 
cannot be characterized as a surprise to the O'Connells. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).3 In 
fact, the trial court specifically found that "after their 
application was accepted the plaintiffs were mailed a subscriber 
certificate containing more detailed information about BCBSU's 
arbitration policy." (R. 187). This finding was specifically 
supported by the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green and Karen Shields, 
and is not challenged by the O'Connells on appeal. (R. 172-178). 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by the record, regardless of 
which policy the O'Connells seek to enforce through the 
Complaint, every insurance policy issued by Blue Cross to the 
O'Connells contained an arbitration provision. See Affidavit of 
Karen Shields; Affidavit of Edwina H. Green (R. 172-177; see also 
(R. 162) (Application for Rowland Hall Policy); (R. 44, 167) 
(Application for Bar Policy); (R. 30, 160) (Bar Policy; 
Subscriber Certificate to Bar Policy); (R. 84-85, 165-166) (Type 
5E4 Policy); (R. 133) (Type 4M-4ML); (R 153) (Endorsement to 
Subscriber Certificate); (R. 156) (Type 4M-4MM). Therefore, the 
O'Connells are bound by the terms of the policy, including the 
3
 Numerous courts have enforced similar statutes, holding 
that actual receipt is not required under these circumstances. 
See, e.g. Atlanta Cas. Co. v Sweeney, 868 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark. 
1994) ("Whether the notice was received by [the insured] is 
irrelevant according to the statute, as 'proof of mailing' is 
'sufficient proof of notice.'"); Isaacson v DeMartin Agency, 
Inc., 893 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Wash. App. 1995) ("Although [the 
insured] stated she did not receive a cancellation notice an 
insurer is not required to prove actual receipt if statutory 
mailing procedures are followed."). 
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arbitration provision, despite their contention that the terms of 
the policy do not apply to them because they either didn't read, 
or don't remember receiving, the policy. 
Third, it is undisputed that after receiving the 
Certificate, and any other relevant policies, the O'Connells 
continued their insurance coverage with Blue Cross. Under these 
circumstances, it is clear that an insured's retention of an 
insurance policy for an extended period of time, without 
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of 
J 
the Policy, including the arbitration provision." Imperial Sav. 
Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also 
I 
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47, (N.M. 
J 
1968); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 
558 (Okla. 1969)). In this case, the Application was signed in 
1993, and the trail court found the O'Connells had received the 
policy by mail. No objection was raised until approximately 
1996, approximately three years after the Application was signed. 
Under Imperial, the O'Connells have waived any right to object to 
the terms of the Certificate. 
Finally, the O'Connells cannot escape the terms of the 
Certificate by reliance upon Ann O'Connells' assertion in her 
Affidavit that she "has not read either version" of the 
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Subscriber Certificates4 (R. 129) . As the trial court noted, 
Utah "case law is clear that a party has a duty to read and 
understand the terms of a contract before signing it." (R. 186); 
Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Utah 1984) (holding 
that a party has a duty to read and understand the terms of a 
contract before signing it). Finally, this Court should reject 
the implication that the O'Connells, an experienced educator (R. 
127) and an attorney, were somehow ambushed by Blue Cross, 
because they never bothered to read any of the many arbitration 
agreements in every single one of their policies. 
II. ALL OF THE O'CONNELLS' CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO 
ARBITRATION, UNDER EITHER THE APPLICATION OR THE 
CERTIFICATE 
A. The Arbitration Agreement(s) Are Unambiguous and Apply 
to the O'Connells' Claims 
The O'Connells attempt to invoke principles of insurance 
contract interpretation to escape their obligation under the 
unambiguous terms of the arbitration agreement(s), arguing that 
the arbitration agreement(s) is/are contracts of "adhesion"5 and 
4
 Little weight should be given Ann O'Connell's 
recollection -- since Ann O'Connell "does not recall filling out 
or signing the application," yet admits "the hand writing [sic] 
and signature appear to be her's [sic] . . . . " (R. 2). 
5
 The mere fact that the Blue Cross contracts are "adhesion" 
contracts should not come as a surprise to the O'Connells, nor 
does the O'Connell's inference that something is somehow wrong 
with adhesion contracts in the insurance industry weigh against 
Blue Cross. The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged, 
(continued...) 
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invoking the principle that insurance policies "should be 
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the 
insured . . . ." O'Connells' Brief, p. 26 (quoting U.S. Fidelity 
and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521-23 (Utah 1993)). 
First, the O'Connells fail to acknowledge that the rule of 
construction upon which the rely only applies in the face of an 
ambiguous term of the policy. See, e.g. Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523 
("If an ambiguity arises, the rules of construction outlined 
above must be employed to resolve the ambiguity."). A court will 
not construe an insurance policy against the insured, absent an 
ambiguity. Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 
798, 807 (Utah 1992) (holding the Court had "no occasion to 
consider" the "application of the canon of construction resolving 
ambiguities against the drafter, " "because the disputed exclusion 
is not ambiguous.") Furthermore, Sandt and other cases 
construing insurance policies in favor of the insured apply this 
doctrine to determine the scope of insurance coverage, construing 
coverage broadly in favor of the insured. Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522 
("ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract . . . 
should be construed in favor of coverage."). 
The arbitration agreements at issue are not ambiguous. 
5
 (...continued) 
"that form contracts are essential to the economic viability of 
the insurance industry." Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. 
Ins., 839 P.2d 798, 803 n.6 (Utah 1992). 
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Under Utah law, for contract language to be ambiguous it must be 
"capable or more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'11 Wiengar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) (emphasis added). In deciding whether an insurance 
policy is ambiguous, the Court should apply a "reasonable 
purchaser" standard. Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523. In this case, the 
trial court specifically found that "the arbitration provision in 
the 1993 application was clearly worded, unambiguous, and not 
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation."6 (R. 188). 
A review of the arbitration agreement reveals the correctness of 
this ruling. See, supra, discussion of Application and 
Certificate. In this regard, the trial court noted "that a 
reasonable purchaser of insurance would be able to read the 
provision [of the Application] and understand that he/she was 
agreeing to submit any disputes to binding arbitration." (R. 
188). Therefore, the rules of interpretation urged by the 
O'Connells do not apply. 
Second, even if there were an ambiguity, the Supreme Court 
has been unequivocal about the broad construction of arbitration 
agreements, specifically holding that if the scope is ambiguous 
6
 It should be noted that the trial court relied upon 
Sandt, the same case cited by the O'Connells, in determining the 
Application was not ambiguous. (R. 188). 
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or debatable, construction is in favor of arbitration: 
It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses 
in a manner that favors arbitration. In Lindon City v. 
Engineers Construction Co., we stated: 
[Arbitration] is a remedy freely bargained 
for by the parties, and "provides a means of 
giving effect to the intention of the 
parties, easing court congestion, and 
providing a method more expeditious and less 
expensive for the resolution of disputes 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally 
interpreted when the issue contested is the scope 
of the clause. If the scope of the clause is 
debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause 
should be construed in favor of arbitration . . . 
636 P.2d at 1073 (quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 
Wash.App. 5954, 602-03, 570 P.2d 713, 717 (1977). 
Our interpretation of the contract in favor of 
arbitration is therefore in keeping with our policy of 
encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when 
the parties have agreed not to litigate. 
Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479 
(Utah 1986) (emphasis added); see also Lindon City v. Engineers 
Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). Because the scope 
of the insurance coverage is not at issue, the principle of 
construction urged by the O'Connells does not conflict with the 
rule that the arbitration agreement(s) must be construed in favor 
of arbitration. 
The O'Connells also imply that arbitration is somehow an 
inadequate or unfavorable remedy. This position has been 
rejected by the Utah courts for many years, and the tradition of 
enforcing arbitration agreements is well founded in Utah. See, 
e.g. Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 
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(Utah 1996) (" [T]he Utah Arbitration Act "'reflects long-standing 
public policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of 
adjudicating disputes.'") (citation omitted); Robinson & Wells, 
P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983) ("The Territory and 
State of Utah have had statutory provisions for arbitration of 
disputes since 1884."); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 
P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1932) (" [A] arbitration is favored in the law 
. . . .
 f f ) . In fact, to the average insured (who is not a trial 
lawyer), the prospect of arbitration is much cheaper and more 
efficient than a jury trial. Under the arbitration agreements, 
the insured can force Blue Cross to proceed to arbitration. If 
construction is to be made of this contract in favor of "the 
insured," it should be based upon the interest of the average 
insured, not the subjective desires of the O'Connells. 
In sum, the fact that arbitration is favored renders the 
rule of construction in favor of the insured inapplicable to an 
arbitration provision in an insurance contract. In Imperial, 
Judge Winder considered and rejected the exact arguments made by 
the O'Connells: 
Relying on Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. 
Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1988), 
vacated, appeal dismissed, 766 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 
198 9), Imperial argues that this ambiguous provision in 
the insurance contract should be construed against 
Stewart as the drafter. 
. . . . this court believes that an arbitration 
clause is distinguishable from other provisions in an 
insurance contract. Furthermore, the court is of the 
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opinion that an arbitration clause is not to be 
construed as favoring one party over the other. Hence, 
this court does not conclude that, even if this 
arbitration provision were considered ambiguous, the 
arbitration provision would be construed against 
Stewart and rendered ineffective. 
73 0 F.Supp. at 1075 (emphasis added).7 
The O'Connells cannot dispute Utah's long history of 
favoring arbitration, and simply citing to another doctrine of 
interpretation -- that insurance contracts are construed against 
the insured -- does not, and cannot, change over 100 years of 
Utah law favoring arbitration in all kinds of disputes. Under 
Utah law, this Court must construe the arbitration agreement(s) 
as broadly as possible, resolving all doubts in favor of 
arbitration, and holding that the O'Connells' entire Complaint is 
subject to arbitration. 
7
 Even the only legal authority cited by the O'Connells 
does not support their argument. The O'Connells cite only 
Wheeler v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1977), for the 
proposition that the arbitration agreement(s) is/are ambiguous. 
This authority is of no help to the O'Connells. First, as 
explained, regardless of the Wheeler court's opinion of the 
arbitration provision at issue in that case, the arbitration 
agreement(s) in this case are not ambiguous. Second, Wheeler, 
along with a number of other cases cited by the O'Connells at the 
trial court level, was specifically rejected by the trial court 
on the grounds that it "involve[d] a factual scenario where a 
patient was required to sign an arbitration agreement immediately 
prior to receiving medical treatment." (R. 189). Obviously, the 
facts of Wheeler are not analogous to those at hand -- where an 
attorney and educator purchased health insurance through their 
employment, with years to consider all their options prior to 
entering into any contract and continued coverage after receiving 
a copy of the policy. 
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B. The Trial Court Incorrectly Excluded the 'Statutory' 
Claim From Arbitration 
Blue Cross specifically appeals the trial court's finding 
that the O'Connells' Third Cause of Action, the so-called 
'statutory' claim, falls outside the scope of the arbitration 
agreement(s). 
1. The O'Connells Cannot Plead Around Arbitration 
The interpretation urged by the O'Connells, if accepted, 
would only encourage plaintiffs to file claims asserting a 
multitude of legal theories in an effort to keep at least some of 
them in litigation. Again, the well-established rule that all 
doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration governs this issue. 
In Docutel, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly rejected the type 
of argument raised by the O'Connel's. In that case, a federal 
trial court did exactly what the trial court has done here -
granted arbitration as to some claims, but not others. 731 P.2d 
at 477. The Utah Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this 
approach, for two reasons - the possibility of inconsistent 
results, and public policy against allowing clever plaintiffs to 
plead around arbitration. The Docutel court reasoned: 
By allocating the claim in part to litigation and in 
part to arbitration based only upon the language of the 
complaint, the federal court has created an entirely 
avoidable set of problems. For example, if 
simultaneous judicial and arbitration proceedings 
render inconsistent results, the parties could be faced 
with a situation in which a court had reviewed the 
evidence and determined Brady and Systems were not 
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liable, and an arbitrator whose decision could be 
enforced as a judgment, had reviewed the same evidence 
and determined that Brady and Systems should pay the 
same debt. 
Id. at 477 n.3. The court went on to address a plaintiff's 
inability to escape arbitration by artful pleading: 
Further, we do not think that an agreement to arbitrate 
should be interpreted so narrowly that its application 
may be avoided by choosing to plead one legal theory 
instead of another. Such narrow interpretation is 
inconsistent with the strong state and federal policies 
favoring arbitration and indeed invites potential 
litigants to attempt to escape arbitration by clothing 
their disputes in different legal theories. 
Id. at 477 n.3 (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court did exactly what the Docutel court has 
prohibited - it split a claim originally asserted as a violation 
of a statute and a contract (the Certificate) into a wholly 
'statutory' claim. The O'Connells' argument that their 
'statutory' claim is somehow different from any other contractual 
claim is nothing more than a belated and convenient attempt to 
plead around the arbitration clause. Under Docutel, this Court 
must reject such an attempt, construe the arbitration 
agreement(s) broadly, and enforce arbitration. 
2. By the Terms of the O'Connells' Complaint, the 
Statutory Claim is Contractual - and Arbitrable 
The O'Connells' own Complaint characterizes the 'statutory' 
258105.1 14 
claim as contractual.8 Upon reconsideration, the trial court 
incorrectly characterized the Third Cause of Action as solely 
statutory and indicated it had "some reservations in leaving such 
issues of statutory interpretation to arbitration."9 (R. 206). 
This ruling is in error for a number of reasons. 
Only after Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration did the 
O'Connells' change this characterization in an obvious attempt to 
plead around the arbitration agreement(s). The O'Connells' 
pleading reflects this simple fact. In pleading this claim to 
the district court, the O'Connells alleged: 
Defendant has breached its contract and statutory 
obligation to provide individual coverage to plaintiffs 
comparable to that provided through the Rowland Hall 
group at a reasonable rate and not based upon condition 
of the plaintiff's health. 
R. 6 (emphasis added); see also Complaint U 9 (alleging that 
"Defendant also agreed in the Subscriber Certificate, issued to 
Ann O'Connell as a member of the Rowland Hall group . . . . " ) , H 
13 (alleging that "Defendant agreed, in the Subscriber 
8
 As noted, the contract the O'Connells base their claims 
upon is the exact same contract containing the Certificate's 
arbitration agreement. 
9
 The trial court's "reservations" over the arbitrator's 
skills or abilities is exactly the kind of bias against 
arbitration that has been disfavored for decades by the appellate 
courts of this state. In short, "Utah law presumes that an 
arbiter appointed and authorized by the parties is capable of 
examining legal documents and statutes to determine questions of 
construction or validity." Allred v. Educators Mur. Ins. Ass'n, 
909 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). 
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Certificate issued to members of the Rowland Hall group . . . 
.") . 
This allegation is clearly covered by the terms of the 
Application, providing for arbitration of "any disputes arising 
between me or the covered family members in the Plan or 
participating provider concerning the applicability of, or 
benefits payable under the Subscriber Agreement." (R. 79) 
(emphasis added). The gist of this claim is that the conversion 
policy provided to the O'Connells does not provide comparable 
benefits to those offered in the first policy -- the Certificate. 
This dispute therefore plainly concerns those "benefits," because 
it contemplates comparing the "benefits payable" under the two 
policies. In addition, the allegation of this claim plainly 
seeks conversion "benefits" under the Blue Cross policy -- and 
the conversion right is a benefit that arises only because of the 
original policy. That policy, of course, is governed by the 
Application and Certificate. 
For the same reasons, the purported 'statutory' claim is 
even more clearly covered by the terms of the Certificate, 
providing for arbitration of "any dispute or controversy 
concerning the construction, interpretation, performance or 
breach of the Agreement arising between the Group, employer, or 
Subscriber, eligible Family Dependent, or the heir-at-law or 
personal representative of such person, and BCBSU, whether 
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involving a claim in tort, contract or otherwise, . . . " (R. 85) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
excluding the O'Connells' Third Cause of Action from the order 
compelling arbitration. 
3. The O'Connells' Supposed Statutory Claim 
Necessarily Arises Out of the Contractual 
Relationship 
As explained in the opening brief, and as never refuted by 
the O'Connells, a conversion right arises out of, and is related 
to, the original policy that gave right to the claim to 
conversion coverage. See Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. 
Co., 973 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Tingey v. 
Picks ley-Richards West, Inc., 953 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Quails v. Blue Cross of California, 22 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(all three holding that conversion policy arises out of original 
ERISA coverage, and therefore claim for benefits is preempted). 
Similarly, any claim the O'Connells might raise concerning 
their conversion coverage, or Blue Cross' alleged failure to 
provide appropriate conversion coverage, necessarily presupposes 
a pre-existing contractual relationship with Blue Cross. In 
fact, the O'Connells allege precisely the existence of a 
preexisting contractual relationship under the Certificate. They 
recognized this when they plead their 'statutory' claim as based 
on statute and contract. It was only after Blue Cross attempted 
to invoke the arbitration clause that the O'Connells converted 
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their claim into one purportedly based upon statute only. 
However, without an existing contractual relationship, there is 
no right to conversion. Accordingly, all of the O'Connells' 
potential claims concerning their conversion rights necessarily 
arise out of the performance by Blue Cross of its original 
contractual obligations. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the O'Connells' 
Remaining Claims Were Subject to Arbitration 
The O'Connells challenge trial court's ruling that the 
O'Connells' First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action were all 
subject to arbitration. (R.183-191). The trial court's ruling 
was correct. 
1. This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review 
the Trial Court's Ruling Granting Arbitration 
This Court ruled on August 8, 1997 that the O'Connells could 
appeal the trial court's ruling granting arbitration based upon 
"Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
considerations of judicial economy." Order, August 8, 1997. 
Blue Cross respectfully request reconsideration of this decision 
as contrary to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the intent of 
the Utah Arbitration Act, and the policy favoring arbitration. 
In short, Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure10 does not confer jurisdiction11 because an order 
compelling arbitration is conspicuously absent from the list of 
orders respecting arbitration made appealable in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-19. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19 (1996). Notably, there is 
no provision allowing immediate appeal from an order compelling 
arbitration. 
The authority is unequivocal in accepting this position. 
For example, the court in Gooding v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., 
878 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1989), addressed the identical issue under 
the Federal Arbitration Act,12 dismissing an appeal from an 
order compelling arbitration for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 
283; see also, Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(acknowledging jurisdiction over an order denying a motion to 
10
 In addition, as a procedural matter, it should be noted 
that the O'Connells did not pursue appeal of the trial court's 
ruling as an interlocutory appeal. (R. 260); see Utah R. App. P. 
5(a) (requiring that "[a]n appeal from an interlocutory order . . 
. be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to 
appeal from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the 
appellate court with jurisdiction . . . . " ) . Accordingly, the 
O'Connells' appeal is not before the Court as an interlocutory 
appeal. 
11
 Rule 1(d) specifically states that " [t]hese rules shall 
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as established by law." Utah 
R. App. P. (1(d). Nor is there any provision that Blue Cross can 
locate allowing jurisdiction based upon judicial economy. 
12
 Utah looks "to the law of other states and to federal 
case law for guidance" to interpret similar provisions in the 
Utah Arbitration Act. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996). 
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compel arbitration as to certain claims, while dismissing cross-
appeals of orders compelling arbitration as to the remaining 
claims for lack of jurisdiction); NEA-Topeka v. Unified School 
Dist. , 925 P.2d 835, 838 (Kan. 1996) ("Orders directing, or 
refusing to stay, arbitration are not appealable.") (quoting 
Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 751 P.2d 
146, rev, denied, 243 Kan. 779 (1988)); see also, Golden Lodge 
No. 13 v. Easlev, 916 P.2d 666, 667 (Colo. App. 1996) (" [A] n 
order directing arbitration . . . is not appealable until the 
arbitration has been completed."). Therefore, as a threshold 
issue, this Court lacks jurisdiction to even consider the 
O'Connells' cross-appeal of the trial court's order compelling 
arbitration. 
2. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the O'Connells' 
Remaining Claims Were Subject to Arbitration 
Even if this Court decides to address the O'Connells' cross-
appeal of the trial court's order compelling arbitration, that 
ruling must be upheld because the O'Connells' claims are clearly 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement(s). As noted, 
supra, it is well-established in Utah that arbitration agreements 
are to be construed broadly with all doubts resolved in favor of 
arbitration, and the trial court found that the language of the 
Application was unambiguous, and included the O'Connells' other 
claims. 
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The First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action all allege 
breach of the insurance contract that is subject to (and in fact 
contains) the arbitration agreement(s) to which the O'Connells 
object. The First Cause of Action alleges that "Defendant has 
breached its contract obligation under the terms of the 
subscriber certificate . . . ." (R. 5) (emphasis added). The 
Second Cause of Action alleges that "Defendant has breached its 
contract obligation to fulfill its promise, made orally and by 
letter, . . . ." (R. 6) (emphasis added). The Fourth Cause of 
Action alleges that "Defendant has, pursuant to the contracts 
alleged supra and the long standing relationship between 
plaintiffs and defendant, a constructive duty to deal with 
plaintiffs fairly and in good faith and breached that duty 
. . . ." (R. 7) (emphasis added). In addition, counts common to 
all these claims specifically reference the Certificate. See 
Complaint H 9 (alleging that "Defendant also agreed in the 
Subscriber Certificate, issued to Ann O'Connell as a member of 
the Rowland Hall group . . . . " ) , H 13 (alleging that "Defendant 
agreed, in the Subscriber Certificate issued to members of the 
Rowland Hall group . . . .") . 
All three of these claims allege breach of a contract 
between the parties, and dispute the health insurance benefits 
the O'Connells are entitled to. These allegation are clearly 
covered by the terms of the Application, providing for 
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arbitration of "any disputes arising between me or the covered 
family members in the Plan or participating provider concerning 
the applicability of, or benefits payable under the Subscriber 
Agreement." (R. 79) (emphasis added). The allegations of the 
First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action are even more clearly 
covered by the terms of the Certificate, providing for 
arbitration of "any dispute or controversy concerning the 
construction, interpretation, performance or breach of the 
Agreement arising between the Group, employer, or Subscriber, 
eligible Family Dependent, or the heir-at-law or personal 
representative of such person, and BCBSU, whether involving a 
claim in tort, contract or otherwise . . . " (R. 85). 
One additional argument must be addressed. For the first 
time on appeal, the O'Connells allege the existence of a 
"separate oral and written promise to allow the O'Connells to 
transfer back and forth between groups." O'Connells' Brief, p. 
32 (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record of a 
separate written or oral promise other than those made in the 
various insurance policies purchased by the O'Connells. To this 
end, and as has been repeated numerous times already, every claim 
raised by the O'Connells' Complaint is based in contract, 
specifically the Certificate. (R. 3-8). Even if this were not 
the case, there is no showing of a separate contract in the 
record, nor can the O'Connells show any consideration for such a 
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contract.13 To argue that Blue Cross somehow issued a wholly 
individual and separate insurance policy to the O'Connells --
different from every other policy issued to an insured -- and 
perhaps did so over the telephone -- is completely lacking in 
evidentiary support. Because all the O'Connells' claims 
necessarily arise out of one of the contracts containing an 
arbitration clause, this belated attempt by the O'Connells to re-
characterize their pleadings must be rejected. See also, 
Docutel, 731 P.2d at 477 n.3. ("[A]n agreement to arbitrate 
should [not] be interpreted so narrowly that its application may 
be avoided by choosing to plead one legal theory instead of 
another.") . 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly ordered that the 
O'Connells' First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action were 
subject to arbitration. 
D. Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements Does Not Violate 
the Utah Constitution 
The O'Connells' final argument is that enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement somehow deprives them of basic rights under 
13
 The only consideration the O'Connells could arguably 
have conveyed to Blue Cross is the premiums paid for the policy 
governed by the Application and Certificate. If the O'Connells 
contend this was the consideration for their claim of a separate 
agreement, then they are necessarily arguing the policy was 
somehow orally or otherwise modified. The arbitration 
agreement(s) obviously apply to any modification of the original 
contract. 
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Article I, Section 7 (the Due Process Clause) and Article I, 
Section 11 (the Open Courts Provision) of the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected exactly these 
arguments in Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1073-74 (Utah 1981) . 
III. BLUE CROSS IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The only argument the O'Connells make on the attorney fee 
issue is that Blue Cross waived its right to request attorney 
fees because the request was not made to the trial court. 
However, Blue Cross has never waived its right to recover fees on 
appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-16, -19 (1996). Under Utah 
law, Blue Cross is entitled to attorney fees incurred in seeking 
this appeal, separate and apart from any fee award by the trial 
court. Under these circumstances, the fact that Blue Cross has 
not yet sought attorney fees from the trial court is irrelevant 
- Blue Cross has an independent right to recover its attorney 
fees on appeal under Section 78-31a-16 because the appeal right 
is separate and independent from any ruling made by the trial 
court.14 Because Blue Cross is entitled to an Order compelling 
14
 The only authority cited by the O'Connells, Sukin v. 
Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah App. 1992) is inapplicable to this 
case. First, Sukin does not address a situation where the right 
to attorney fees arises directly and independently from the 
appeal, and does not involve the Utah Arbitration Act. In fact, 
Sukin doesn't even address the issue of attorney fees. See id. 
at 926 (discussing allegation of bias against trial court, noting 
(continued...) 
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arbitration of all the O'Connells' claims, Blue Cross is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-16 & 
-19 (1996) . 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred in refusing to compel arbitration 
as to all of the O'Connells' claims against Blue Cross. Each 
such claim is plainly subject to the broad arbitration 
agreement(s) agreed to by the O'Connells. The Court should 
reverse the district court's order severing the conversion claim 
and remand for entry of an order compelling arbitration as to all 
claims. In addition, the remand order should direct the entry of 
a reasonable attorneys' fee for BCBSU in connection with the 
district court proceedings and this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-16 (1997) . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 day of April, 1998. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By 
Andrei H. Stone 
James E. Magleby 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
14
 ( . . . continued) 
"we do not address the issue of bias or prejudice because it has 
been raised for the first time on appeal."). 
SL^ 
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